By Abdul Quayyum Khan Kundi
Before assessing today’s geopolitical turbulence, it is essential to revisit the foundational sources of power and the hierarchy they create in the international system.
Geopolitical power rests on three principal pillars: diplomatic reach and alliance-building capacity; military capability; and the size, productivity, and innovative strength of an economy. Mere economic output is insufficient—efficiency, technological advancement, and institutional resilience matter just as much.
Based on these criteria, states can be broadly categorized into three tiers. At the top are superpowers, possessing global reach and the ability to shape international outcomes across regions. Below them are bridge or regional powers, which exert decisive influence within their neighborhoods and often act as intermediaries between major powers. At the base are satellite states, which lack independent leverage and align themselves with stronger actors to ensure security and relevance.
At present, only two countries qualify as true superpowers: the United States and China. A second tier of influential regional powers includes Russia, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, Iran, and Germany. Most other states operate within the gravitational pull of these actors. What makes the current moment historically significant is that several middle powers now possess the potential—under the right conditions—to evolve into future superpowers. Among the most notable contenders are Turkey, Brazil, and Germany.
This evolving dynamic was evident as early as 2018, when the competition between Turkey and Iran for regional influence became increasingly pronounced. While Saudi Arabia has often been considered part of this contest, its limited diplomatic depth and constrained military autonomy have prevented it from matching the strategic sophistication of Ankara or Tehran. Between Turkey and Iran, Turkey has consistently held structural advantages: a diversified economy, long-standing relations with Western institutions, extensive historical familiarity with the Middle East, and a capacity to mobilize popular sentiment across the Muslim world.
Over the past decade, these advantages have translated into tangible outcomes. Turkey has steadily expanded its regional footprint while Iran’s influence has come under sustained pressure. In Syria, Ankara has effectively marginalized the Iranian-aligned Assad regime in key areas and supported political arrangements aligned with Turkish interests. In Lebanon, Iranian leverage through Hezbollah has weakened amid sustained American and Israeli pressure. In the South Caucasus, Turkey played a decisive role in Azerbaijan’s success against Russian-backed Armenia, reshaping the balance of power in the region and resolving the long-standing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Iraq remains the final arena where Iran retains significant influence, though even there its position appears increasingly fragile. Notably, Turkey has achieved these gains without provoking direct confrontation with Iran, maintaining a pragmatic and largely stable bilateral relationship that has endured, with interruptions, for more than three centuries.
Turkey’s ambitions, however, extend beyond incremental regional influence. The country increasingly views itself as a civilizational power with historical continuity stretching back to the Ottoman era. Just as President Vladimir Putin has drawn on Russia’s imperial past to frame Moscow’s global role, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has invoked Ottoman history to legitimize Turkey’s renewed strategic assertiveness. The central uncertainty lies not in Turkey’s trajectory, but in succession: whether this vision can be institutionalized and sustained beyond Erdoğan’s tenure.
Saudi Arabia, by contrast, presents a different picture. Despite immense financial resources and an energetic young leadership, the kingdom has struggled to translate wealth into coherent regional strategy. Its foreign policy often appears reactive rather than disciplined, and its multiple defense partnerships—ranging from Pakistan to Egypt and Somalia—suggest breadth without focus. Moreover, the strategic centrality of oil has diminished in global markets, reducing Riyadh’s traditional leverage.
The kingdom has also been unable to consolidate leadership within the Gulf. The United Arab Emirates now competes directly with Saudi Arabia across several theaters, including Yemen, Sudan, Libya, and the Horn of Africa, while Qatar has positioned itself as a diplomatic intermediary, hosting negotiations and peace talks in a role reminiscent of Switzerland’s traditional neutrality.
Meanwhile, the two existing superpowers face profound internal constraints. The United States continues to grapple with deep political polarization, placing strain on democratic norms and encouraging a more inward-looking posture. China, although economically formidable, confronts demographic decline and the limitations of a closed political system that complicates alliance-building. President Xi Jinping’s decision to dismantle established succession norms has further introduced uncertainty into China’s long-term strategic outlook.
As a new global order gradually takes shape, the coming quarter century will be decisive. Power will not shift overnight, but the foundations are already being laid. Whether Turkey, Brazil, or Germany can ultimately transcend regional status and attain superpower standing will depend on leadership continuity, economic resilience, institutional strength, and the ability to inspire durable partnerships.
What is clear is that the era of unchallenged dominance is fading. The future will be defined not by a single hegemon, but by a more complex and competitive distribution of power—one in which agile middle powers may play a far greater role than ever before.
